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Restating Conflicts Again:
A Cure for Schizophrenia?t
COURTLAND H. PETERSON"
Professor Shreve's open-ended invitation to "comment on any aspect of the
proposal for a third restatement of conflicts which interests you" provides an
opportunity which I welcome for several reasons. First, his generous offer is broad
enough to include a response with an absolute minimum bf footnotes-which is
something I have always wanted to do.'
Second, and more importantly, it has provided an opportunity for me to reflect on
some conclusions reached in the process of almost forty years ofteaching this subject,
and to try to articulate those conclusions no less for myself than for others. As
always, such a process generates more questions than answers. In doing so it
demonstrates the validity of one proposition about legal learning to which many of
us subscribe, however, that asking the right questions is more important than getting
the right answers. The sticky part, of course, is in establishing which questions are
"right."
I.
I begin with an observation about the perennial schizophrenia of the American Law
Institute ("ALI") with respect to the role of the restatements. Are they properly only
a reflection of existing practice and theory in the field in question, as the name
"restatement" suggests, or can they appropriately be "prestatements," charting a
course for that which the law ought to become? Or can they be both, in some
undetermined proportion? Most restatements have, without doubt, tried to combine
both roles, in varying proportions in different subject fields. One most striking
example of prestatement occurred in the original formulation of section 90 of the
Restatement ofthe Law ofContracts, concerning promissory estoppel, based on mere
straws in the wind in existing case law,' but presaging the incredible growth of
"reliance theory" in the American cases and the huge importance if not dominance
t Copyright 2000 by Courtland H. Peterson.
* Nicholas Doman Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Colorado.
1. 1 recognize that footnotes are sometimes an aid to further research, and are a courteous
method of attributing ideas to their appropriate sources. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the
almost compulsive footnoting by American legal writers tends to interrupt and fragment the
reasoning process. As to the need for attribution, I frankly confess that I have had very few
original ideas in my lifetime. Almost all of the thoughts I have on this subject (including those
in this Comment) are attributable to colleagues and other writers on this subject, to a host of
judicial authors whose opinions I have tried to digest over the years, and to the critical
responses of thousands of students. I therefore disclaim any originality in what follows, but I
am also at a loss to identify all of the sources of the ideas expressed, since they have come
together in my own thinking in a kind of composite without a lot of footnotes. Readers who
find it curious that I should explain my aversion to footnotes in a footnote are referred to the
Holmesian aphorism that "All generalizations are false, including this one."
2. See Greiner v. Greiner, 293 P. 759 (Kan. 1930); Devecmon v. Shaw, 14 A. 464 (Md.
1888); Rickets v. Scothom, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898); Siegal v. Spear & Co., 138 N.E. 414
(N.Y. 1923); In re Taylor's Estate, 167 N.E. 434 (N.Y. 1929).
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of the reliance concept in various parts of the Restatement (Second) of the Law of
Contracts.' Similar examples can probably be found in the Restatement of the Law
of Torts, although the burgeoning theories of liability for personal injury that have
appeared in the last forty years appear to be more a product of judicial innovation
than a result of the influence and prestige of the ALL.4 No doubt some examples of
prestatement can be found in virtually all of the Restatements.
As for the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws ("Second Restatement"), it
seems to me that the Reporter, Professor Willis Reese, was strongly committed to the
basic goal of restating, but the case law and academic theory were changing so
rapidly during the process of drafting that he was shooting at a constantly moving
target. Ample evidence of that can be found, for anyone who needs it, in the constant
succession of drafts which emerged during the seventeen years it took to produce the
final version of the Second Restatement. To be sure, the "principles underlying
conflict of laws" which he had formulated with Professor Elliott Cheatham at the
middle of the century were important parameters in his approach to the project,5 and
most of these principles survived to become the section 6 principles of the Second
Restatement.6 But as I understand their earlier formulation, these principles were
perceived as already embodied in case law, and resided there like Michelangelo's
slaves, simply waiting to be released from the surrounding stone. If that is true then
even section 6 is faithful to the restatement function.
II.
It seems useful to consider the proposal for a third restatement in the light of this
dichotomy of functions, but the consideration goes beyond the simple duality of
restatement and prestatement functions. On the restatement side at least two primary
objectives, or some combination of them, are apparently driving the proposal. The
first is that we ought to restate the decisional law of conflicts, but this time we ought
to "get it right." The second is that, conceding the utility of the central approach of
the Second Restatement, we ought to "clean it up," pruning the parts that were
inaccurate from the outset and abandoning the excess baggage that has not been used
by the courts.
3. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTHE LAw OF CONTRACTS §§ 38 cmt. a, 88,89(c), 90,
139, 150 (1981). This phenomenon led one renowned scholar to conclude that reliance has
replaced bargain as the central basis for enforcing promises. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH
OF CONTRACT 72 (1974).
4. See generally 1 AMERICAN LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 14-19 (1991). The exception proving the rule is
section 402A of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) (1965), which is itself probably
properly viewed as an example of prestatement establishing strict liability for defective
products.
5. Elliott E. Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM.
L. REv. 959 (1952).
6. See Courtland H. Peterson, Private International Law at the End of the Twentieth
Century: Progress or Regress?, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 197, 204-05 (Supp. 1998). The
nonsurvivor, of course, was what Cheatham and Reese originally called "justice in the
individual case," which was later revived as the "better law" theory. Id. at 205.
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As for "getting it right," several authors have suggested that the time is ripe for
empirical studies,7 of the kind already begun by Dean Patrick Borchers and others,'
to determine what it is the courts are in fact doing. Presumably this would differ from
the normal process of collecting, analyzing, and classifying the cases-a process
traditionally involved in all restatements. The traditional method assumes, with few
exceptions, thatjudicial opinions mean what they say and that they accurately reflect
not only the result reached but also the reasoning process used in getting there. The
necessity of "empirical studies" presumably arises from suspicion that opinions do
not mean what they say, or do not accurately reflect the reasoning of the opinion
writer, and in either case may be misleading at least for precedential purposes.
There may indeed be a consensus that such a sorry state of affairs exists in the
general run of conflicts cases. I am much inclined to accept that unhappy conclusion,
but less sanguine than others about the potential of empirical studies as a remedy for
the situation. There are truly formidable difficulties. First, if restatement is supposed
to reflect actual practice, and if we really want to get it right, we need to look not only
at the behavior ofjudges but also at the behavior of lawyers and their clients. It is a
virtual certainty that the latter often settle controversies involving conflicts questions
precisely because the outcome of litigation would be unpredictable. How does one
restate that practice? And even as to settlements which occur because the resolution
of the conflicts issues was thought to be predictable, how does one accumulate the
data to make such a study? I am reminded of the difficulties encountered by the early
Realists, and particularly of the efforts of Professor Underhill Moore to analyze the
actual practices of banks in discounting notes of their customers. Anyone who doubts
that empirical studies of this kind are enormously labor intensive should revisit the
series of articles Moore published in the Yale Law Journal from 1929 to 193 .
Anyone who does read them will find them pretty heavy going.
Moore was also quite critical of the limited success of less scientific empirical
approaches, which he accounted for as a failure to attempt to correlate judicial
behavior with any events except the "facts of the case." In his view the lawyer's
persistent pursuit of his laws in the "facts of the case" may be explained by the
fact that the judges and administrators themselves in their opinions began quite
irrelevantly and ambiguously to say that their behavior was the necessary
consequence of these laws. From necessary logical deduction to necessary
behavior was an easy step, and the transformation ofscientific generalizations into
Law was complete. Whetherthis new and puissant being was the daughter ofGod,
7. See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Prologomenon to an Empirical
Restatement of Conflicts, 75 IND. L.J. 417 (2000).
8. See PatrickJ. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 357 (1992); Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of
Choice of Law, 24 GA. L. REv. 49 (1989).
9. Underhill Moore & Theodore S. Hope, Jr., An Institutional Approach to the Law of
Commercial Banking, 38 YALE L.J. 703 (1929); Underhill Moore & Gilbert Sussman, Legal
and Institutional MethodsApplied to the Debiting ofDirect Discounts (pts. 1-6), 40 YALE L.J.
381, 555, 752, 928, 1055, 1219 (1930-3 1).
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of nature, or of the state, her will had been ascertained by correlating judicial
behavior with the facts of the case, and should therefore continue to be so
ascertained.' 0
Moore thought that the field of inquiry had to be extended systematically to include
not only the facts of the case but also the relation between judicial behavior and the
institutional ways of behaving in the contemporary culture of the place where the
facts occurred and the decision was made." For our purposes that seems to me to be
an impossible task. I do not know how far we should go in pursuit of the systematic
study which Moore envisioned, but I am less critical than he of attempts to determine
existing law simply in terms of outcomes of judicial behavior, especially if only
limited reliance is placed on the articulated reasons for decision. In any event it seems
to me this is probably about the best that we can hope for from empirical studies in
this area.
Although more such modest studies would of course be helpful if not essential to
the restatement function of a third restatement, that useful enterprise is not dependent
on the decision to construct a third restatement. Surely most of us would applaud
further efforts at such clarification, quite apart from the undertaking of a third edition.
I would not go so far as my friend Professor Friedrich Juenger, in asserting that one
should not try to restate the unrestatable.'2 But I do agree with Professor William
Richman that any decision to assemble a new restatement presupposes at least some
substantial consensus about what is to be restated. 3 In my view it is most doubtful
that any such consensus yet exists, at least as to the SecondRestatement's choice-of-
law regime. Empirical studies may help in time to achieve such a consensus, and they
should surely go forward, with all the diversity which investigators with different
theoretical orientations will bring to the task. But to identify a single Reporter, or to
begin drafting at this stage, seems premature. To do so would either constitute a
prejudgment about the primacy of one of the various theoretical positions still in
competition-presumably the view held by the Reporter selected for the job--or else
it would impose on the new Reporter the same burden of eclecticism which Professor
Reese struggled so mightily to fulfill.
Turning to the alternative objective of a new restatement, namely, that of cleaning
up the Second Restatement, somewhat similar observations must be made. The
necessity or desirability of a consensus still exists, even if mere revision is
undertaken, but in some areas it might be possible to find one. I am intrigued by the
possibility, for example, that even modestly structured empirical research might
develop a consensus supporting some parts of Professor Louise Weinberg's proposed
revision of section 6. Her proposed revision contemplates admittedly radical surgery,
restoring "better law" to the principles of section 6, deleting the reference to "needs
of the interstate and international system," adding an antidiscrimination principle to
10. Moore & Hope, supra note 9, at 704.
11. See id. at 705.
12. See Friedrich K. Juenger, A Third Conflicts Restdtement?, 75 IND. L.J. 403, 415-16
(2000).
13. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 7, at 427.
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that section, and "cutting to the chase" (section 6) for the real keys to
decisionmaking. 4 Her provocative description makes fascinating reading, but I do not
understand her to claim a consensus for her view.
III.
The necessity or at least desirability of a consensus before a restatement is
undertaken is a question worth pursuing. If no significant consensus exists, as
apparently it did not at the time the original Restatement of the Law of Conflict of
Laws ("First Restatement") was undertaken by Professor Joseph Beale, then the
issuance of a restatement clearly invites a deluge of criticism. Beale's First
Restatement did just that, with Professor Walter Wheeler Cook leading the charge,
and other critics close behind."5 These critiques were devastating, but unfortunately
offered no persuasive theoretical alternatives. And what of the courts? So far as I can
tell, they welcomed the mechanical jurisprudence of the First Restatement with open
arms, and over the twenty years which passed before the decision to initiate a Second
Restatement only a handful of decisions-mostly proposing a center-of-gravity
theory--overtly challenged the vested-rights approach proposed by Beale. 6
Could one then say that there was a consensus favoring a SecondRestatement when
that decision was taken in 1953? Hardly, if by consensus we mean agreement about
the law to be restated. But there was a sort of consensus, not about what to do, but
that something needed to be done: the scholars had overtly challenged the vested-
rights theory, while the courts had covertly challenged it by avoiding unpalatable
results through the array of escape devices exposed by the scholarly critics. 7
Several of the principal authors in this Symposium have noted that the Second
Restatement was conceived as a "transitional" document, and that even Professor
Reese viewed it in that light. Again, as with the First Restatement, scholarly critics
quickly emerged, this time led by Professors Brainerd Currie and Albert Ehrenzweig.
This time, however, the critics were offering alternatives. Currie and Ehrenzweig both
preached the primacy of forum law, although from very different starting points."8
They were joined, over time, by a platoon of other scholars offering a menu of
alternatives, ranging from "functional" theories 9 to "choice-influencing"
14. Louise Weinberg, A StructuralRevision ofthe Conflicts Restatement, 75 IND. L.J. 475,
485 (2000).
15. Cook's articles were ultimately collected in book form as WALTER WHEELER COOK,
THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942). See also Ernest G.
Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict ofLaws, 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924).
16. Notably, W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 63 N.E.2d 417 (Ind. 1945), and Auten v. Auten,
124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954).
17. Law school casebooks on conflict of laws typically include a section under the heading
of "Escape Devices" (or some equivalent of this), detailing how the courts have avoided
unacceptable results through manipulation of characterization, renvoi, and d4pegage. For a
recent example, see SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, WENDY COLLINS PERDUE & ARTHUR T. VON
MEHREN, CONFLICT OF LAWS: AMERCAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 40-99 (1998).
18. See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 15-23 (2d ed. 1992).
19. Id. at 23-29.
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considerations." As already noted, Professor Reese responded to this barrage of new
theory by incorporating important parts of it in the Second Restatement in a series of
drafts that evolved over more than seventeen years.
Many of us, as observers of these efforts, thought he was trying to put the same
saddle on several horses moving in different directions. I once described it as an
attempt at ecumenicalism in an era of "true believers."'" The document he produced,
however, and which the ALl approved, turned out to be surprisingly persuasive to
many of the appellate courts in this country. As Dean Symeonides's surveys have
demonstrated over the past decade, no single theory is dominant in the United States,
but the Second Restatement has attracted many more adherents than any of the other
theoretical "approaches," and these now outnumber the states clinging to the
"traditional" vested-rights theory of the First Restatement.' It may well be true, as
Professor Juenger has suggested, that it was precisely this eclectic indeterminacy of
the Second Restatement that made judges like it and academics detest it.'
What does this thumbnail sketch of the American "conflicts revolution" tell us
about the necessity or desirability of consensus? It may be fair to say that the First
Restatement lacked any real consensus except common acceptance of the goal of
predictability, but it was the "only game in town," and ultimately failed when
uniformity of result regardless of forum was shown to be unattainable. The Second
Restatement started with a consensus that something ought to be done, but without
any common understanding of what should be done. It has failed to satisfy scholarly
aspirations because there are now too many games in town, and in part because it has
tried to be responsive to too many competing theories. At least superficially there is
a partial consensus among American courts, based on an asserted adherence to the
Second Restatement, but that may well come unglued as empirical studies
demonstrate the variety of different outcomes that are being produced in the name of
the same theory. Moreover, as Professor Juenger points outjudicial eclecticism often
treats disparate doctrines as interchangeable.24
If there is no significant consensus about what should be restated, is it at least true
(as was the case with the decision to undertake the Second Restatement) that
agreement exists that something ought to be done? If the views of the principal
authors of this Symposium are any measure, then even that limited consensus is
lacking. Dean Symeonides thinks we ought to begin a third restatement and has even
started drafting. Professor Juenger thinks any restatement at this point would be a
waste of paper. Professor Richman thinks a new restatement at this point would be
premature, but that the ALl should lay the groundwork for such a future effort by
creating a study group. Professor Weinberg would go forward now, not by a complete
departure from the SecondRestatement, but by cleaning it up through radical surgery,
20. Id. at 29-31.
21. Courtland H. Peterson, Weighing Contacts in Conflicts Cases: The Handmaiden Axiom,
9 DUQ. L. REv. 436, 441 & n.30 (1971).
22. E.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1997,46 AM.
J. COMp. L. 233, 266 (1998). The most recent survey cites all II of the preceding surveys. See
Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1998: Twelfth Annual
Survey, 47 AM. J. COmp. L. 327, 328 n.5 (1999).
23. See Juenger, supra note 12, at 404-05.
24. See id. at 411.
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including transplants. Certainly the views of the principal authors, taken as a whole,
do not reflect any consensus which I am able to identify.
I do not profess to know how much of a consensus we need before launching a
third restatement. The history of the first two Restatements may be an inadequate
guide, but it seems to me that if there are any lessons to be learned from them, they
teach that we do not yet have clear enough common ground to begin again. On
balance I come down aboutwhere Professors Richman and Reynolds do, thatthe ALl
should appoint a study group to work for the next few years, as systematically as
possible, in identifying the extent to which there is common ground.' I could not
possibly improve on their suggestion of two people to lead such a group, namely
Deans Symeonides and Borchers.' I would urge, however, that the group include
broad representation of various viewpoints, and that an even broader advisory group
be invited to comment as the work progresses.
IV.
The absence of a present consensus again calls into question the tension between
restatement and prestatement. An important aspect of that tension is cast in sharp
relief by recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court which have clarified some of
the ambiguities surrounding both venue andjurisdiction, and the relationship between
these and choice of law.27 Some of these "clarifications" seem to me to be very
wrongheaded, and they pose a real test of character for me. I now know, for example,
that states may acquire personal jurisdiction by service of process on transients within
their territory, even though they have no other connection with the parties or the case,
and notwithstanding some hopeful earlier signs that this archaic rule was to be
abandoned.2" (Individual states may, of course, decline to exercise this power, but are
not likely to do so in the absence of constitutional compulsion.) Should a revision cast
this clarification in stone, as a matter of restatement, or should we indulge in a
prestatement reflecting the prevailing academic view, that this is an ugly and
unnecessary rule rejected by most of the legal systems of the civilized world?29
Thus even in areas where consensus can be found, pure restatement may be
unpalatable and prestatement tempting. There are no clear benchmarks by which we
can judge the propriety ofprestatement, or the extent to which we can or should yield
to that temptation. One strong impression I have, which I cannot document and would
not even know how to document, is that restatements are most influential when their
basic thrust is mainly confined to analyzing, organizing, and clarifying existing
25. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 7, at 434.
26. See id. at 434 n.85.
27. See generally Courtland H. Peterson, Proposals ofMarriage Between Jurisdiction and
Choice of Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 869 (1981) (discussing relationship between
jurisdiction and choice of law).
28. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604,621 (1990) (rejecting the earlier dictum
in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 209 (1977), which emphasized the relationship of the
defendant and the cause of action to the forum, and held that the presence of property alone,
unrelated to the cause of action, would not support state jurisdiction).
29. See The Future ofPersonalJurisdiction: A Symposium on Burnham v. Superior Court,
22 RUTGERS L.J. 559 (1991).
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decisional law, and when their prestatements occur only in critical areas of need or
uncertainty which are exposed by the more traditional process. It seems probable that
prestatement is likely to succeed only if two preconditions are met: first, that the law
in question is uncertain, and second, that the proposed revision appeals to a common
conception of fairness. The "gotcha" jurisdiction revision would meet the second of
these tests but not the first.
Would the undertaking of a third restatement offer any cure for the schizophrenia
of the ALl about restatement as opposed to prestatement? In my view it would not,
and it may well exacerbate the problem if we again proceed on the assumption that
something needs to be done, even though we do not know what it is.
V.
One of the virtues of a study group would be that it does not require commitment
to either a third restatement or a revision of SecondRestatement. Decision to do either
of these things could be deferred pending an evaluation of what the study produces.
Moreover, the study may well give us some further information that would permit an
informed decision about the extent to which prestatement would be feasible, if, as I
have suggested, feasibility depends on a combined double test of uncertainty and an
appeal to fairness.
For example, Professor Weinberg's proposal of an antidiscrimination principle
might well meet both tests. 0 Her suggested resurrection of a "better law" principle
may meet both tests,3' at least if its use were limited to situations where the law is
otherwise uncertain. Perhaps an agenda addressed to this subject would even enlist
the invaluable support of Professor Juenger.
What are some of the other subjects which should be addressed? There are, of
course, many possibilities. In what follows I mention only a few which seem to me
to be essential.
Some authors have suggested that much of the conflicts revolution was dominated
by such matters as "guest" statutes, damages limitations in wrongful death cases, and
charitable immunity-that these are now dead issues, and that we should move on.
In my view nothing could be further from the truth. The wave of "tort reform"
legislation that has swept over the country in the past dozen years has replaced
whatever gains were made in repealing the archaic statutes or rules which produced
those issues, and the new legislation is not only more pervasive but continues to
present precisely the same kinds of problems which were grist for the mill of the
"revolution."
Let me suggest a few examples taken from my own state. Colorado was, to be sure,
one of the two or three states in which the tort reformers (primarily insurance
companies) were most successful in selling the legislature their product, but similar
examples of some of these "reforms" can be found in a majority of other states.
Although Colorado did repeal its guest statute and some of the limitations on
wrongful death damages, since 1986 more than forty other pieces of legislation have
30. See Weinberg, supra note 14, at 503-06.
31. Id. at 501.
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been enacted which, primarily through limitations on remedies, present potential
conflicts issues.
We now have limitations on damages on a variety of fronts. Damages for
noneconomic harm (pain and suffering and the like) are limited to $250,000 for most
cases, and $500,000 for extraordinary cases.32 Punitive damages are limited to an
amount equal to the "actual" damages awarded,33 and evidence of the income or net
worth of a defendant shall not be considered in determining the appropriateness or
amount of such damages? 4 Common law dramshop liability is abolished but liability
of vendors of alcoholic beverages is limited to $150,000, and liability is further
limited by a "willfully and knowingly" standard of proof.35 Damages recoverable
against health care providers are limited to a total of one million dollars, with some
exceptions, but are limited to $250,000 for noneconomic harm (including derivative
claims). 6 Governmental immunity is partially waived, but liability for entities' or
employees' acts is limited to $150,000 per claimant and $600,000 per occurrence. 7
The list of defendants entitled to full or partial immunity from tort liability also grew
exponentially, to include not only good samaritans in general," donors of food,39
directors and officers of nonprofit corporations, 0 corporate directors and officers who
were not personally involved in the commission of a tort by a corporate employee,4'
and mental health care providers for violent acts of their patients,42 but also gun
manufacturers. 43 Especially noteworthy recipients of immunity or partial immunity
status, in the conflicts setting, are entrepreneurs whose activities are specifically
aimed at tourists-including operators of ski resorts,4 providers of professional
baseball games,45 and sponsors of equine activities.46 Although provisions for the
latter were originally aimed at protecting operators of stables renting saddle horses,
in the interests of fairness the statute has been amended to include llamas, alpacas,
guanacos, and vicunas.47
Added to the lists of shortened statutes of limitations were a number of"statutes of
repose," aimed at barring not only the action but liability itself, for a number of
32. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102.5(3)(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 1999).
33. Id. § 13-21-102(l)(a) (West 1997).
34. See id. § 13-21-102(6).
35. Id. § 12-47-801 (West Supp. 1999).
36. See id. § 13-64-302(1) (West 1997 & Supp. 1999).
37. See id. § 24-10-114(1)(a)-(b) (West 1990 & Supp. 1999).
38. See id. § 13-21-108 (West 1997).
39. See id. § 13-21-113.
40. See id. § 13-21-116.
41. See id. § 7-108-402 (West 1999).
42. See id. § 13-21-117 (West 1997).
43. See id. § 13-21-501.
44. See id. §§ 33-44-112 to -113 (West 1998).
45. See icL § 13-21-120 (West 1997).
46. See id. § 13-21-119.
47. See id. § 13-21-119(f.l).
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actors. Included are most manufacturers and sellers48 for product liability (two
years),49 doctors accused of medical malpractice (three years),"° architects and
builders (six years),"' and land surveyors (ten years).,2
To those of us who "cut our conflicts teeth" on guest statutes and damages
limitations, this looks like Yogi Berra's "ddjt vu all over again." Not only have these
problems not gone away, but in fact these statutes may introduce some new ones as
well, at least in terms of the policies implicated by some of the new and innovative
protections offered by such provisions. In any event a study of current conflicts
problems should consider in detail the problems presented by this new wave of
legislation, and the cases which are beginning to deal with them. The Second
Restatement, of course, leaves many of the problems generated by "tort reform"
wholly at large.
Another area deserving attention by a study group, in my opinion, is the principle
of protecting justified expectations of the parties. This has often gotten lost in past
analyses, especially in the search for, or invention of, state interests. Expectation is,
of course, the centerpiece of party autonomy in the contracts area, but justified
expectations may also play a role in some of the efforts to formulate more precise
choice rules. For example, the fairness of imposing a common-domicile rule on the
parties, and of making a distinction between conduct-regulation and loss-distribution
issues-both of which Dean Symeonides incorporates in his tentative
proposals 53-seem to me to rest on an expectations rationale. Limits on expectations,
especially examining the use of adhesion contracts to produce what is essentially a
one-party choice of law or forum, also need further exploration.
VI.
I conclude with a brief reference to the role of governmental interest analysis, and
its relationship to the future development of conflict of laws. Like Professors Kramer
and Juenger, I find most of the current judicial opinions in this area both
disappointing and confusing. 4 Like Juenger I am especially troubled by the
assumption indulged by some courts, including the United States Supreme Court, that
"interests" and "contacts" are the same thing, or at least closely related.55 Like many
writers I am surprised that the subject of interest analysis continues to dominate so
much of academic discussion in the area of conflicts, notwithstanding the fact that so
few courts have expressly adopted this approach after forty years of its elaboration. 6
One possible explanation, of course, is that a number of courts, while professing
48. See id, § 13-80-107 (West 1997).
49. See id. § 13-80-106.
50. See id. § 13-80-102.5 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999).
51. See id. § 13-80-104.
52. See id. § 13-80-105 (West 1997).
53. See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Need for a Third Conflicts Restatement (And a
Proposal for Tort Conflicts), 75 IND. L.J. 437, 459-63, 452-58.
54. See Juenger, supra note 12, at 405-06; Larry Kramer, On the Needfor Uniform Choice
of Code, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 2134, 2149 (1991).
55. See Juenger, supra note 12, at 403 nn.2, 4.
56. See Symposium, Choice ofLaw: How It Ought To Be, 48 MERCERL. REv. 623 (1997).
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adherence to the Second Restatement, have gone straight to the "interest" principles
of section 6 to solve difficult problems, and have thus used interest analysis without
appropriate attribution.
I have an alternative explanation. I believe that the survival of interest analysis as
a dominant aspect of conflicts theory is a result of the fact that law professors use it
to teach the subject of conflict of laws--even if they do not personally subscribe to
its methodology. It catches students' attention, intrigues them, and provides a vehicle
with amazing explanatory power to get them interested in the jurisprudential aspects
of the conflict of laws. I also believe that most students, having been taken on this
trip, reject interest analysis as too unpredictable, too much lacking in hard edges, too
inefficient, and too little concerned with justice in the individual case. I am not
unhappy with that result, but I have always used interest analysis as a teaching tool
because I think that the trip is highly educational. One may hope, however, that if a
study group is formed to explore the current state of conflicts law, it will not become
bogged down in interest analysis, and will not let that topic dominate the inquiry.
Professor Juenger has chided me for expressing the hope that we can find
principled rules for the future,5" and I confess to having cited the common-domicile
concept and the conduct-regulation, loss-distribution distinction as hopeful signs of
development."s (I also confess to having cited the conflicts provisions of the ALI
Complex Litigation Project, but I firmly deny having done so with approval.S0 In
professing this hope, as I still do, I am also guided by what I perceive to be the
collective view of my students, over time. Together we are concerned about the
results of cases, and whatever system is developed must make room for
considerations of fairness. Reference to the "better law" as a tie breaker may be away
to accomplish this, but it will not solve all problems. If there are to be rules we want
them to be policy driven rather than arbitrary, if that is possible. But we recognize
that there is value in judicial efficiency, and in predictability, and if push comes to
shove we would rather have an arbitrary rule than no guidance at all.
57. See Juenger, supra note 12, at 408 nn. 46-47
58. See Peterson, supra note 6, at 226.
59. See id. at 227 n. 147. I called it "important," which it is, but not "hopeful," which it is
not. Id. at 227.
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